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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12711

EARL IIENRY ROBISON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEJ\'.IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a criminal procee<ling in which the appellant, Earl Henry Robison, was charged with the crime
of murder in the first degree by information filed in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
on July 8, 1971.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge, commencing
August 30, 1971. On September 2, 1971, the case was
submitted to the jury which returned a verdict of guilty
of the lesser included offense of murder in the second
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degree. On September 10, 1971, the appellant "as
sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison for
the indeterminate term as provided for the crime of
murder in the second degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
Approximately 5 :30 p.m., on l\fay 6, 1971, the
police responding to information received went to the
foothills above 13th Avenue in Salt Lake City and
found the body of one Roland Briggs. The cause of
death was the result of a gunshot wound ( T. 111) . On
May 7th, 1971, the defendant was apprehended and
placed in custody for first degree murder.
The defendant testified that he and the deceased
had gone up to the avenues earlier and that the defendant was going to scare .Mr. Briggs with a gun. That
during the conversation and while the defendant was
trying to unchamber the pistol it accidentally went off
and struck Briggs. (T. 215-217).
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts of
appellant, however, feels that the following facts should
be added:
After Briggs had been mortally wounded by the
shot from Robison's gun, the appellant made no effort
to render assistance of any kind, but "jumped in the car
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and took off." ('I'. 217-220). Appellant returned to
the scene of the crime later on that evening to retrieve
the spent cartridge from which the fatal shot had been
fired, but again made no ef'fort to aid the victim
(T. 161) . After defendant had retrieved the cartridge
and fled the scene of the crime the second time, he made
no effort to report the incident to the police or to notify
them of his or the deceased's whereabouts and had no
contact with them until his aITest the following day.

POINT I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION, NO. 5-0,
\VAS NOT IN ERROR BUT PROPERLY REFLECTED THE LAW AND CLEARLY
STATED DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE
CASE.
It should be noted that although the defendant has
the right to have the jury instructed as to his theory

of the case, he does not have the right to have his requested instructions given in his own language. People
v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 185 P .2d 1 ( 1947).
Respondent maintains that the instruction as given
by the trial court was not in error but properly reflected
the law and clearly stated the defendant's theory of the
case.
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Under state law, intent to kill is a necessary element of murder and of voluntary manslaughter. State
v. Stenbach:, 78 Utah 350, 365, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-30-3 (1953)
No. 3. The
dividing line between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter is mainly drawn along the line of intent, and
it was at the point of that distinction that the trial court
inserted the words "not intentional" instead of "accidental" in its instruction to the jury. Intent is necessary
for voluntary manslaughter but unnecessary for involuntary manslaughter. S'tate v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 97, 60
P.2d 952 (1936). In this area, the law speaks in terms
of intent or no intent and not in terms of accident or
nonaccident. It was, therefore, necessary in order to
properly reflect the law to the jury, that the court in
its instruction to it included a statement concerning intent. It would have been misleading to the jury and
would not have been a proper statement of the law to
have instructed it purely on the basis of accident as
defendant requested. Certainly, it is not maintained by
appellant that the defendant has the right to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the case in language
that does not properly reflect the law.
The appellant maintains that he had a right to have
the jury instructed on his theory of the case that the
shooting was accidental. The instruction given presented that theory. It stated, "You are instructed that it is
the theory of the defense that defendant did not intend
to shoot Roland Briggs but such shooting, if by defendant, was accidental." The court added the provision, "if

the jury found the shooting to be by the defendant and
accidental, that it must not convict the defendant of murder or voluntary manslaughter, but it must consider whether or not defendant was guilty of unvoluntary manslaughter or not guilty as defined in the instructions."
Such a statement seems sufficiently clear as to leave no
doubt in the juror's minds as to the defendant's theory
of the case.
The instruction seems even more sufficient and appropriate when it is noted that immediately following
it, the court instructed the jury as to the law on accidental killing. Instruction No. 5-P was given as fallows:
"You are instructed that homicide is excusable when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful
means, with usual and ordinary caution and
without any unlawful intent or when committed by accident and misfortune."
Respondent maintains that because the jury instruction properly reflected the law and clearly stated
defendant's theory of accidental shooting; the instruction was not in error and defendant was not denied the
right to have his theory of the case properly presented
to the jury.
Approaching this issue from another viewpoint, it
is meaningless to argue that the substitution of the
words "not intentional" for the word "accidental" in
the instru<'tion was prejudicial, when there seems to be
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little or no difference in the meaning of the terms.
These words are frequently used interchangeably both
by laymen and jurists. fV ebsters Dictionary lists "unintentional" as a synonym for accidental, and "accidental" as an antonym for unintentional.
The common law is replete with instances in which
the courts have used the terms interchangeably or considered them to be synonomous. The following quotations from court opinions are indicative of this:

"'Accidental' is a happening or coming by
chance, or without design, casual, fortuitous,
taking place unexpectedly, unintentionally, or
out of the usual course. 'Accidental' is the
antithesis of intentional." Farmer v. Railway
Mail Ass'n, 57 S.W.2d 744, 746, 227 Mo. App.
1082 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
"The adjective 'accidental' is not a technical term but a common one, whose popular
usage would not necessarily mean that the
words 'Accidental injuries' indicated the existence of an accident, but rather the idea that
the injury was either nnintended or unexpected." Quality lJiild Products v. Linde, 15 P.2d
58, 60, 159 Okl. 256 ( 1932). (Emphasis
added.)

" . 'Accidental' qualifies and describes
the noun by ascribing to injuries a quality or
condition of happening or coming by chance or
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without design, taking place unexpectedly or
unintentionally." Andrews ll'Iining & Milling
Co. v. Atkinson, 135 P.2d 960, 962, 192 Oki.
322 ( 1943) . (Emphasis added.)
The meanings of the terms "accidental" and "not
intentional" are essentially the same, and for appellant
to argue that he was prejudiced by the court's substitution of the term "not intentional" for the term "accidental" makes no more sense than to argue that to
substitute the word "twelve" for the words "one dozen"
would be prejudicial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 4-D, RELATIV.E TO FLIGHT AS
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT THE GIVING OF SUCH INSTRUCTION.
Since it is well established that flight from the
scene of the crime may be regarded as evidence bearing
upon the guilt of the accused, State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah
2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 ( 1961), appellant's argument
seems to reflect somewhat of a misconception as to
what actions are necessary to constitute flight. In order
to have flight in the legal sense, it is not necessary to
have an escape from custody or a fleeing from pursuing
officers. As the Washington Supreme Court stated in
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State

t'.

TVilson, 174 P.2d 553, 562, 26 Wash.2d 468

(1946),
"To constitute 'flight' it is not necessary
that there should be escape from jail or from
an officer, but flight may consist in a departure from the place of the crime by one conscious of guilt, even before suspected of the
. "
crime.
The following two cases seems to indicate that just
before leaving the scene of the crime may be sufficient
to constitute flight.
"Flight is usually considered to exist when
accused departs from the vicinity of the crime
and is only a circumstance to be considered by
jury under appropriate instructions." Neiling
v. State, Fla., 40 So.2d 120, 121 ( 1949).
" ... since 'flight' consists in leaving the
scene or vicinity of crime and may be shown as
a circumstance to indicate guilt." State v. Silvey, l\1o. 896 S.vV. 128, 131 ( 1956).

It is also well settled that it is not prejudicial for
the court to instruct the jury on a question unless there
is no evidence to support the instruction. As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Carmen, 228
P.2d 281, 284 (Cal. 1951):

"It is elementary that the court should instruct the jury on every material question upon
which there is any evidence deserving of any
consideration ·whatever."

People v. Perkins, 171P.2d919 (Cal. 1946) states

the rule for determining whether an instruction is supported by the evidence. It states:
"An instruction is supported by the evidence if it addresses itself to any theory permissible under the evidence."

People v. Smith, 142 Cal. App.2d 287, 298 P.2d

540,54 (1956) states:

"An instruction is proper if it is consistent
with any reasonable inferences the jury might
draw."
These cases point out that if there is any evidence
at all to support an instruction, then it is not prejudicial
for the court to give it to the jury.
In the present case, it is the appellant's contention
that there was no evidence to support the court's Instruction No. 4-D, relative to filght, that there was no
evidence that appellant left the scene of the crime under circumstances which warranted the giving of the instruction to the jury. He maintains that there was no
evidence that appellant may have left the scene under
a consciousness of guilty or fear of prosecution. Such
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a statement is without foundation. Not only is there
evidence to support the inference that defendant left
the scene under a consciousness of guilt or fear of prosecution, but it shows that that is the only reasonable expiation for his departure.
Appellant testified that after he fired the shot.
the victim fell and informed him that he was dying
(T. 156). He admitted that he did not attempt in any
way to render assistance, he didn't examine the deceased, although he had a car he didn't try to take him
to receive medical attention, he didn't try to call an
ambulance (T. 220), he just "jumped in the car and
took off." (T. 217). Robison states that he left the
scene of the crime because he was "scared." ( T. 217).
Scared of what? He couldn't have been afraid of the
victim, because he posed no threat to him, Robison testified that Briggs fell immediately and couldn't get up
(T. 238). The two of them were alone in a secluderl
area ( T. 78), there was nothing in the vicinity that
posed a threat to appellant. In view of these facts, it
seems only logical that Robison's fear was fear of prosecution, that his own sense of guilt inspired him to flee.
Appellant maintains that the fact that he returned
to the scene of the crime later on that evening with a
friend demonstrates the absence of a sense of guilt or
fear of prosecution. The evidence, on the contrary,
shows that he returned to the scene not to render assistance as he claimed, as when he went hack to the scene
he didn't take a first-aid kit or any other medical equip-
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ment, and when he arrived he didn't examme the deceased or even check for a heartbeat (T. 161), but
quickly retrieved the spent cartridge from which the
fatal shot was fired, and again fled ( T. 161). The
record shows that before his second visit to the scene,
he was advised that he had better go get the cartridge
(T. 141), that he told a friend that he was going back
to get the cartridge, and that when he arrived at the
scene, he found it and left immediately (T. 154). There
was also testimony presented that he had told a friend
that he was sure that Briggs was dead before he ever
returned to the scene the second time ( T. 284) .
It should further be noted that the fact that he returned to the scene, regardless of his intentions in so
doing, would not demonstrate necessarily that he didn't
flee the scene of the crime the first time with a consciousness of guilt or fear of prosecution because it is
established that there is no specific time constituting
flight and the distance traveled is immaterial. People v.
Autman, 65 N.E.2d 772, 774, 393 Ill. 262 (1946). ll'/use
v. State, 196 So. 148, 150, 29 Ala App. 271 ( 1946).

Furthermore, defendant fled from the scene not
once, but twice. Evidence of either flight would have
been sufficient to justify the court's instructing the
jury on the matter of flight. Defendant claims that he
fled the scene the first time because he was scared, but
offers no explanation for fleeing the scene the second
time. By then he had had time to overcome any initial
shock or fright, to carefully think the matter through,
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to weigh the alternatives, and yet he still made no effort
to render assistance, to call for medical aid, or even to
notify the police, but simply made an attempt to conceal the evidence that could be used against him and
again fled. 'Vhat but a consciousness of guilt or fear
of prosecution would inspire such conduct?
The words and actions of the accused after flight
from the scene may be used to explain the defendant's
state of mind at the time of flight. Gilbert v. State, 20
Ala. App. 28 100 So. 566 (1924). The evidence shows
that immediately after fleeing the scene, defendant
went to considerable effort to dismantle and dispose
of the gun and the cartridge ( T. 157.; T. 130-131). It
also reveals that he ran and hid in the bedroom of a
friend's apartment upon hearing someone arrive downstairs (T. 283). Defendant never did notify the police
as to the whereabouts of the body or turn himself in.
The record makes it clear that there was more than
substantial evidence to support the theory that appellant
fled the scene of the crime not only once but twice, and
that he did so with a consciousness of guilt or fear of
prosecution. With this in mind, it is certain that it was
not prejudicial error for the court to instruct the jury
relative to flight.
In support of his position, appellant cites a partial
statement from the dictum of State 'l'. Sulli'can, 203 A.2d
177, 43 N.J. 209 ( 1964), a case in which the defendants
killed a hotel clerk in the course of a robbery and were
apprehended by the police a short time later as they
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were attempting to flee m an automobile. The New
Jersey Appellate Court in finding that the giving of
an instruction regarding the possible significance of
flight similar to the one used in the present case was
not erroneous, stated:
"Departure from the scene after a crime
has been committed of itself does not warrant
an inference of guilt, and for departure to take
on legal significance of flight, there must be
unexplained circumstances which in conjunction with leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it has been done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to
avoid accusation based on guilt."
As respondent has already shown, the evidence reveals that such unexplained circumstances were present
in this case which would reasonably justify an inference
that appellant fled the scene with a consciousness of
guilt.
In People v. Schwab, 288 P.2d 627, 135 Cal.
App.2d 280 ( 1955), an instruction almost identical to
the one used in this case was upheld by the California
Court of Appeals. In that case, defendant made an attack on his victim with a knife while in the victim's
home. Another member of the household confronted def emlant with a rifle and ordered him to leave. Defendant left the scene of the crime in his car and sought out
a friend. He, both alone and with his friend, loitered
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in the area for over eighteen hours before surrendering
himself to the police. At the trial, the court gave the
fallowing instruction :
"The flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is
not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but
is a fact which, if pro,·ed, may be considered
by you in the light of all other proved facts in
deciding the question of his guilt or innocence.
"rhether or not e,·idence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be
attached to such a circumstance, are matters
for your determination." Id. at 631.
The court further stated:
"There was no error in the instruction. The
facts are some proof of a purpose to escape
detection. "rule his flight may not have been
sufficient in itself to establish guilt, his movements were such as to justify their consideration as evidence of a consciousness of guilt and
the finding of the weight to be giYen them was
a fnnction of the jury." Id. at 631.
It is also in1portant to look carefully at the instruc·
tion itself. It does not instruct the jury that they are
to infer a sense of guilt from appellant's departure from
the scene of the crime as appellant argues. but merely
states that flight. if proved, is to be weighed along with
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all the other facts in deciding guilt or innocence. The
court did not direct the jury to draw the inference, but
left that matter entirely to its discretion. The :Mississippi
Supreme Court in Shedd v. State, 203 :Miss. 544, 33
So.2d 816 ( 1947), found that point to be important.
The following instruction was given in that case:
"The court instructs the jury for the state
that flight is a circumstance for which an inference of guilt may be drawn and considered
along with all other facts and circumstances
connected with the case." Id. at 819.
The court in upholding the instruction stated:
"This instruction is saved from error because it told the jury that flight could be 'considered along with all other facts and circumstances connected with the case." Id. at 819.
In view of the rule that an instruction regarding
flight is proper in this state; that it is not prejudicial
if there is any evidence to support it; and looking at the
strong support that the evidence in this case gives the
instruction, keeping in mind the wording of the instruction itself, it is clear that there was no prejudicial error
in giving the instruction to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's contention that it was prejudicial to
substitute the words "not intentional" for the word "accidental" in Instruction 5-0 is without basis. Such a
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change was necessary to make the instruction properly
reflect the law. Furthermore, the words are so close in
meaning that the substitution of one for the other <lid
not change the meaning of the instruction.
Appellant's second claim that it was prejudicial to
give Instruction 4-D regarding the significance to be
given to evidence of flight is also unfounded. Sufficient
evidence was introduced to support such an instruction
and the law clearly indicates that in such cases an instruction regarding flight is proper.
The instructions given by the court to the jury
were therefore not erroneous and consequently the conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. R01\1NEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
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